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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a summary judgment issued by the Honorable Samuel
McVey, Fourth District Court, dismissing a legal malpractice action by Dr. Michael H.
Jensen ("Jensen"), against Appellee Allen K. Young ("Young"). The Utah Supreme
Court has original appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78A-3-102.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
ISSUE: Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment on the ground that
the four year statute of limitations had run on Jensen's legal malpractice action by April
of 2003 when Jensen did not discover his injury until this Court overturned a jury verdict
in his favor in 2005?
Standard of Appellate Review: The Utah Supreme Court reviews a trial court's
decision granting summary judgment for correctness, giving no deference to its legal
conclusions. See Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ewart 2007 UT 52, | 9 , 167 P.3d 1011. All
facts and reasonable inferences are viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party. See id. at f2.
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Preservation of Issue: Young raised and briefed this issue in his summary
judgment memoranda. (R. 388-180; 749-565.)1 Jensen also addressed this issue in his
Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 548-430.)
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS
Utah Code Arm. § 78B-2-307(3) (2008) states, "An action may be brought within
four years: (3) for relief not otherwise provided by law."
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is determinative of the issues
presented and is included in the Addendum due to its length. Utah R. Civ. P. 56.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case,
This is a legal malpractice case brought by Jensen against Young. It arises out of a
claim Jensen brought against United Television, Inc. (KTVX or Channel 4) and Mary
Sawyers, a reporter for Channel 4 News for damages caused by three defamatory
broadcasts that were harmful to Jensen's reputation and ultimately to his medical
practice. The three broadcasts occurred respectively on September 5, 1995; June 17,
1996; and November 6, 1996. See Jensen v. Sawyers. 2005 UT 81,ffl[12-17, 130 P.3d
1

For reference, each file in the record is reverse paginated. Therefore, the page number
of the first page of a document is higher than the page number of the last page of the
same document. In this brief, we cite the first page first, although it is the higher number,
i.e. (R. 30-22).
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325. Young filed suit on Jensen's behalf in June of 1997, following the third broadcast.
Jensen's causes of action included fraud and misrepresentation, intentional interference
with prospective economic relations, negligent misrepresentation, defamation of
character, and negligence. Id, f 18. Sawyers and KTVX filed for summary judgment
based on the one year statute of limitations for defamation, and Jensen's defamation
claim was dismissed. His fraud and misrepresentation claims were also dismissed. Id.
However, the court simultaneously allowed Jensen, represented by counsel he hired to
replace Young, to amend his complaint to add claims including false light invasion of
privacy that would not be affected by the one year statute of limitations for defamation.
Id.,f 20. The Jury returned a verdict in Jensen's favor and awarded him $2,940,900 in
damages. On appeal, this Court overturned the jury verdict, holding that Jensen's false
light invasion of privacy claims were barred by the one year statute of limitations for
defamation. IcLl 143.
On February 7, 2007, Jensen filed this suit against Young alleging malpractice for
failure to file suit before the statute of limitations ran. Jensen had not done so earlier
because, until this Court reversed the jury verdict in 2005, he did not believe he had been
injured by Young's mistake since his claim was successful and he was awarded a
multimillion dollar jury verdict.

3

B. Course of Proceedings,
After discovery was completed, Young filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on
Jensen's legal malpractice claims on three grounds:
1) That Jensen's malpractice claims were barred by the four year statute of
limitations for legal malpractice.
2) That an attorney-client relationship had not formed between Young and Jensen
prior to the second broadcast.
3) That Jensen's punitive damage claim relating to the first and second broadcast
was effectively barred by the Supreme Court's decision in Jensen v. Young.
(R. 386-385.)
Jensen filed an opposition memorandum (R. 548-430), arguing that the discovery
rule should apply to toll the statute of limitations until after the issuance of Jensen v.
Young. Young filed a reply memorandum (R. 749-563), as well as a supplemental
memorandum. (R. 898-767.) Jensen opposed the supplemental memorandum, but later
consented to it during oral arguments. (R. 958 p. 2-3.)
C. Disposition of the Court Below.
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The Fourth District Court entered summary judgment dismissing Jensen's claims
on July 22,2008. (R. 947-944.) The court held that summary judgment was appropriate
because the statute of limitations began to run on Jensen's claims, at the latest, on April
22, 1999, which is the date on which Jensen's defamation claim was dismissed and he
was allowed to amend his complaint. (R. 945.) The court deemed as a potential question
of fact whether Young and Jensen formed an attorney-client relationship prior to the
second broadcast, but declined to address that question because the statute of limitations
effectively dismissed all of Jensen's claims. (R. 946.) Once his complaint was dismissed,
Jensen timely filed for this appeal. (R. 951-949.)
D. Statement of Relevant Facts.
1. Timeline of Critical Dates and Events.
The following is an outline of critical events and dates to assist the Court in the
review of Jensen's appeal.
i.

The Chanel 4 Broadcasts.
1.

September 5, 1995- First broadcast aired by KTVX on Jensen.

2.

June 17, 1996- Second broadcast aired by KTVX on Jensen.

3.

November 6, 1996- Third broadcast aired by KTVX on Jensen.
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ii.

Trial Court Procedural History in Jensen v. Sawyers.
1.

September 6, 1995- Columbia FirstMed terminated Jensen's
employment. Mountain View Hospital in Utah County revoked
Jensen's privileges to practice medicine at the facility. IHC Health
Plans removed Jensen from its insurance panel. The Department of
Professional Licensing started an investigation of Jensen.

2.

September 1995- Jensen meets with Young to discuss filing a
lawsuit against KTVX in conjunction with the first broadcast.
Young informed Jensen that prior to acceptance of the lawsuit, he
wanted to wait for the outcome of the DOPL investigation. Young
also told Jensen that the case was likely worth a lot of money, and
discussed his success in past cases. At the time, Jensen believed
Young to be his lawyer, even though no retainer agreement had been
signed.

3.

April 9, 1997- Jensen signed a fee agreement retaining Young to
represent him in filing suit against KTVX and Sawyers.

4.

June 27, 1997- Young filed a Complaint on Jensen's behalf asserting
claims for defamation arising out of the three broadcasts.
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January 28, 1999- Young formally withdrew as Jensen's attorney.
April 22, 1999- The trial court grants KTVX and Sawyer's Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment dismissing Jensen's defamation
claims arising from the First and Second Broadcast because the
Complaint was filed after the defamation statute of limitations had
expired.
April 22, 1999- The same day that Jensen's defamation claims were
dismissed, the trial court allowed Jensen to amend his Complaint to
plead false light invasion of privacy relating to both the First and
Second Broadcast.
October 25, 2001- Final judgment was entered by the trial court in
Jensen v. Sawyers reflecting a jury verdict in favor of Jensen for
false light invasion of privacy on the First and Second Broadcasts.
Jensen was awarded $520,000.00 in economic loss damages,
$85,000.00 in general damages, and $245,300.00 in punitive
damages. The jury also returned a verdict for Jensen on the Third
Broadcast for false light invasion of privacy and defamation,
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awarding him $1,000,000.00 in economic loss, $500,000.00 in
general damages, and $450,600.00 in punitive damages.
Appellate Procedural History in Jensen v. Sawyers.
1.

November 15, 2005- The Supreme Court ruled that Jensen's claims
for false light invasion of privacy on the First and Second Broadcasts
were barred by the one year defamation statute of limitations. The
Court reversed the $1,000,000.00 economic loss award relating to
the Third Broadcast, ruling that there was no evidence to support
that award because the evidence demonstrated that all of Jensen's
economic loss was caused by the First Broadcast.

Trial Court Procedural History in Jensen v. Young.
1.

February 7, 2007- Jensen filed suit against Young for legal
malpractice.

2.

July 23, 2008- The trial court grants Young's Motion for Summary
Judgment finding that Jensen's legal malpractice claims began to run
not later than April 22, 1999. This is the day when the trial court in
Jensen v. Sawyers dismissed the defamation claims arising from the
First and Second Broadcasts and simultaneously allowed Jensen to
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amend his Complaint to plead false light invasion of privacy.
Consequently, under the trial court's paradigm, the statute of
limitations on Jensen's legal malpractice claim expired on April 21,
2003.
2. Events leading to the underlying claim.
The events leading to Jensen's original claim against Mary Sawyers and KTVX
began when Sawyers, a reporter for Channel 4 news, approached Jensen about obtaining
weight loss medication because, as she told Jensen, she had gained weight and was in
danger of losing her job as a news reporter because she looked bad on camera. Jensen,
2005 UT 81,14. Jensen told Sawyers she should come to his office to discuss treatment
options, not knowing he would be the victim of a news channel sting operation.
Ms. Sawyers made an appointment with Jensen, and appeared for treatment at his
office wearing a hidden camera and recorder, which she used to record her visit with Dr.
Jensen. Id., Tf 7. Jensen prescribed two weight loss drugs, and he and Sawyers had a
conversation about possible alternative medication if what was prescribed was
ineffective, including use of the drug Dexedrine. LI Sawyers later met with Jensen to
interview him about the weight loss drugs, and confronted him about whether the drugs
he prescribed, and the manner in which he prescribed them were safe. Id Portions of the
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recordings from Sawyers's initial appointment and her interview with Jensen were later
used in three Channel 4 news broadcasts, originally aired on September 5, 1995; June 17,
1996; and November 6, 1996, in which Jensen was accused of prescribing the medication
too freely, and prescribing medicines that should not be taken together. Id, 112. The
broadcasts resulted in damage to Jensen's medical career, and action by the State
Department of Professional Licensing (DOPL). Id., <[| 14. Jensen retained attorney Max
Wheeler to defend him in the DOPL investigation, and sought additional counsel to
represent him in a civil suit against Sawyers and KTVX for the injury the broadcast
caused. (R. 291.)
3. Jensen's relationship with Young.
Soon after the first broadcast, Jensen was introduced to Young, who offered his
services regarding possible claims against Sawyers and KTVX. (R. 661.) Two to three
weeks later, Jensen and Young met in Young's office. (R. 656.) Young was shown the
tape of the first broadcast, and informed Jensen that he liked the case, calling it "sexy."
Id He said he was willing to take the case. (R. 488-487.) However, Young informed
Jensen that, prior to taking the case, he wanted to wait for the outcome of the DOPL
investigation. (R. 655.) Young also told Jensen that the case was likely worth a lot of
money, and discussed his success in past cases. (R. 294.) At the time, Jensen believed
Young to be his lawyer, even though no retainer agreement had been signed. (R. 483.)
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Although Jensen and Young discussed the case and the possibility of bringing defamation
as a cause of action, Young did not warn Jensen about any issues with the short, one year
statute of limitations for defamation claims.
From the time of the first meeting until November of 1996, after the airing of the
third broadcast, Jensen and Young's contact was limited. Jensen believes that he met with
Young briefly sometime after the second broadcast to show him a recording of the
broadcast. (R. 288, 486-485.) However, his concern during that time was mostly with
defending himself against the DOPL investigation, which concluded on October 30,
1996. (R. 213.) Jensen also met with other attorneys during that time to discuss his
injuries and possible claims against others, including the state, although he decided not to
pursue those claims or retain those attorneys. (R. 631-629, 479-474, 285-284.)
Nonetheless, Jensen considered Young to be his attorney for the purposes of suing KTVX
and Sawyers, and believed that he had accepted the case. (R. 483.)
Jensen and Young met more frequently after the third broadcast. Jensen sent
Young a letter and a recording of the third broadcast on November 12, 1996. (R. 601.)
Young responded to him that, "we shouldn't sit on this any longer, the third newscast is
inflammatory and we need to file a complaint." (R. 273.) Jensen signed a fee agreement
on April 9, 1997 for Young to represent him against KTVX and Sawyers. (R. 261-260.)
On June 27, 1997, more than one year after the first and second broadcasts, Young filed a
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complaint asserting claims for defamation arising out of each of the three broadcasts. (R.
314-306.)
4. The underlying case after the statute of limitations was missed.
Shortly after filing the complaint, Young contacted Jensen and informed him that
there was a one year statute of limitations on defamation claims and that he had "blown"
the statute with respect to the first and second broadcasts. (R. 473.) However, rather than
taking responsibility for the mistake, or informing Jensen of the potentially severe
consequences, Young tried to downplay the mistake. When Jensen asked how missing the
statute of limitations affected his case, Young responded, "I'm sure this is an issue, but
I'm going after fraud and also defamation. It's not like we just—you know—dinner's
ruined. We can work with this." (R. 473.) Young downplayed the defamation cause of
action and insisted that Jensen's actionable claims arising from the first and second
broadcasts arose from claims of fraud. (R. 441.) Young withdrew as Jensen's counsel on
unrelated grounds on January 28, 1999. (Docket, Jensen v. Sawyers, Fourth District
Court, Provo, Case No. 9704000512.)
Thereafter, Sawyers and KTVX filed a motion for summary judgment based on
the missed statute of limitations, and also seeking to dismiss the fraud causes of action
that Young had alleged on Jensen's behalf. Jensen, 2005 UT 81, f 18. Jensen, through his
replacement counsel concurrently sought to amend his complaint to include claims of
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false light invasion of privacy. Id, f 19-20. The trial court granted both motions. At the
time his defamation claims were dismissed, Jensen admittedly knew that his case had
been "disadvantaged." (R. 248-245.) However, Young's mistake was apparently
remedied. The trial proceeded, and the jury issued a verdict in Jensen's favor on his false
light claims, awarding him $2,940,900 in damages. Jensen, 2005 UT 81, f 22.
Jensen did not realize the gravity of Young's mistake until this Court overturned
his award in 2005. Id, f 143. The Court held that his false light claim was barred by the
one year defamation statute of limitations, and significantly reduced his award. Id Upon
discovering his injury, Jensen brought this suit in 2007 to recover damages from Young.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This Court should overturn the trial court's grant of summary judgment and, due
to the special circumstances of this case, apply the discovery rule to toll the statute of
limitations until after the issuance of this Court's opinion in Jensen v. Sawyers.
The application of the discovery rule analysis dictates that when an injured party
does not know, and should not have known of his injury, the Court applies a balancing
test to determine if special circumstances warrant application of the discovery rule. In a
legal malpractice case, where damages and injury are speculative and remote at the time
the malpractice is committed, injury is not ascertainable until the resolution of the
underlying suit from which the malpractice arose.
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Jensen did not know of his injuries because at the time when Young missed the
statute of limitations, and even when the trial court dismissed Jensen's defamation
claims, injury was too speculative and remote for Jensen to ascertain. This is because
Jensen was allowed to amend his complaint, and as a layman, he believed that Young's
mistake was remedied. It was not until this Court overturned his multimillion dollar
verdict in 2005 that Jensen realized he had been injured by the dismissal of the
defamation claims several years earlier. To rule that Jensen could have known of his
injury prior to that time would require clairvoyance beyond what should be expected of a
lay individual. Further, it would prevent Jensen from fully recovering for his injuries, as
his damages were merely speculative at the time the trial court in this case found that the
legal malpractice cause of action had run.
Once it is shown that the party did not know, and could not have known of his
injuries, the Court should balance the hardship the statue of limitations places on the
plaintiff against any prejudice to the defendant resulting from the difficulties of proof
caused by the passage of time. In this case, to not apply the discovery rule would
essentially bar Jensen's claim entirely. If the discovery rule did not apply, he would have
been forced to bring a claim at a time when he could not assert a non-speculative injury,
and thus would not be able to assert malpractice. At very best, he could have recovered
attorneys' fees for the cost of amending his complaint—a fraction of what he was injured
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by Young's malpractice. Because the facts required to litigate this case were easily
discoverable through deposition and through a written record, Young would not be
greatly burdened by the passage of time. In fact, the arguments he would have made
defending the legal malpractice action if it were filed earlier are all still available to him
at this time. In short, Young would not be greatly burdened by the application of the
discovery rule. Conversely, if this Court does not apply the rule, Jensen will suffer great
injustice.
In order to ensure just results in this rare case where Jensen's malpractice injury is
masked by a favorable jury verdict, this Court should hold that the discovery rule applies
to toll the statute of limitations until the jury's verdict was overturned by an adverse
appellate decision. Not applying the discovery rule in this rare circumstance would leave
injured parties, such as Dr. Jensen, without recourse simply because they prevailed in the
trial of the underlying case.
The requirements for application of the discovery rule are met here, as Jensen did
not know, and should not have known of his injury, and thus the nature of this case
creates an extraordinary circumstance. Therefore, Appellant asks this Court to overturn
the grant of summary judgment and apply the discovery rule in this case.
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I

ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS HAD RUN ON JENSEN'S LEGAL MALPRACTICE
CLAIM BECAUSE EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES WARRANT
THE APPLICATION OF THE DISCOVERY RULE TO TOLL THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS UNTIL THIS COURT RULED IN THE
UNDERLYING MATTER.
This Court's opinion in Jensen v. Sawyers was one of the facts that ultimately
gave rise to Jensen's cause of action against Young, because it was not until the case was
decided on appeal that Jensen knew he had been damaged by Young's negligence.
Because of the extraordinary circumstances in this case, this Court should overturn the
grant of summary judgment and apply the discovery rule to toll the four year statute of
limitations for legal malpractice until after this Court issued its decision in Jensen v.
Sawyers.
The discovery rule is a judicially created doctrine that serves to toll the statute of
limitations until after "the plaintiff learns of or in the exercise of reasonable diligence
should have learned of the facts which give rise to the cause of action." Williams v.
Howard, 970 P.2d 1282, 1284 (Utah 1998). The rule applies in three situations: "1) where
mandated by statute,, 2) where a plaintiff is unaware of a cause of action because of the
defendant's misleading conduct or concealment, and 3) where application is warranted by
the existence of special circumstances that would, based on a balancing test, render the
application of the statute of limitations unjust or irrational." Id at 1285.
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This case creates special circumstances that warrant the application of the
discovery rule because Jensen did not know, and could not have known that he was
injured by Young's negligence until this Court overturned a multimillion dollar jury
verdict in his favor, revealing his injury for the first time. Requiring Jensen to bring his
claim prior to this Court's ruling in the underlying matter would force him to seek
damages that were too speculative and remote to constitute injury, and would stand as a
bar to recovery for the full extent he was injured. Applying the traditional statute of
limitations in this case, that the trial court held began at the time Jensen's defamation
claims were dismissed in the underlying matter on April 22, 1999, creates a situation that
is truly unjust and irrational.
A. Dr. Jensen did not know and could not have known of his cause of action until
the issuance of this Court's decision in the underlying matter.
When applying the discovery rule because of special circumstances, the Court
must first look to whether the injured party knew or should have known of his injury
before the running of the statute of limitations. Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d
1125, 1129 (Utah 1992). If the injured party knew or should have known of his cause of
action before the running of the statute of limitations, there is little justification to allow
application of the discovery rule. Because the statute of limitations generally begins to
run upon the happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action, Id at
1128-29, it follows that under the discovery rule, the statute should only begin to run
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upon the discovery of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action. Hence, the
injured party must have "become aware of his injuries or damages and a possible cause of
action before the statute of limitations expires," to prevent application of the discovery
rule. Williams, 970 P.2d at 1285.
Where the injury caused by legal malpractice is only materialized by an adverse
judgment against the injured party in the underlying matter, any injury is too speculative
or remote for the party to ascertain prior to that final judgment. Wagner v. Sellinger, 847
A.2d 1151, 1156 (D.C. 2004). This is especially true in instances, such as this, where the
attorney's negligence has seemingly been remedied, and any real injury is only apparent
after a final judgment. Because he could not ascertain the injury until this Court's ruling
in Jensen v. Sawyers in 2005, Dr. Jensen did not, and could not have discovered the
malpractice committed by Young prior to the running of the statute of limitations.
i. Dr. Jensen did not know of his injury prior to this Court's ruling in the underlying
matter because his claim was seemingly remedied, as Young had assured him it
could be.
For the discovery rule to apply due to special circumstances, the injured party
must be unaware of his injuries or damages and a possible cause of action until after the
statute of limitations expires. Williams, 970 P.2d at 1285. In Williams, an attorney
discovered that he had failed to file a complaint before the statute of limitations had run,
completely barring his client's claim. Upon discovery of the mistake, the attorney met
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with his client to discuss the mistake and its potential impact on the case. Id at 1283-84.
The attorney also wrote a letter to his client stating that he accepted responsibility for
"any loss that [his client] sustained by reason of [the attorney's] failure." IdL When a
malpractice action was filed more than four years after the incident, the court declined to
apply the discovery rule because the client was made aware of his injury and cause of
action well before the statute of limitations had run. Id at 1285. The court noted, "the
discovery rule does not apply to a plaintiff who becomes aware of his injuries or damages
and a possible cause of action before the statute of limitations expires." Id (emphasis
added). If the injured party is unaware of his injury or unaware of the cause of action, the
court should proceed to apply the special circumstances balancing test.
Unlike in Williams, Jensen was not aware of his injury until after the statute of
limitations had run. Nor could he have reasonably been expected to know of his injury
and resulting damages. In fact, it appeared to Jensen that he was uninjured by Young's
malpractice because Jensen had received a multimillion dollar jury verdict. Even when
the defamation claims were dismissed on summary judgment in the underlying matter,
Jensen did not have reason to immediately discover the malpractice cause of action
because his attorneys were simultaneously allowed to amend his claim of defamation to
false light invasion of privacy. (R. 248-245.) Young's representations to Jensen that
"dinner isn't ruined," because his case centered on causes of action other than defamation
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served further to convince Jensen that the mistake was not fatal to his case, and could be
remedied. (R. 473.) The trial court supported Young's representations when it allowed
Jensen to amend his complaint and the jury awarded him a more than generous verdict
based on his other claims. Jensen, 2005 UT 81 at |22. The favorable verdict making
Young's mistake seem inconsequential, there was no way for Jensen to understand the
true consequence of the mistake or comprehend that he had been damaged until this
Court ruled in Jensen v. Sawyers.
ii. The injuries caused by Young's malpractice were too speculative and remote for
Jensen, as a lay individual, to ascertain until after this Court's final judgment in
the underlying matter.
When it is uncertain whether a client will sustain injury from legal malpractice
until after a judgment or settlement in the underlying matter, injury and damages are too
speculative and remote to be ascertained. See Wagner, 847 A.2d at 1156; Lucev v. Law
Offices of Pretzel & Stouffer, 703 N.E.2d 473, 478 (111. App. Ct. 1998); Welborn v.
Shipman, 608 So.2d 334, 335 (Ala. 1992); K.J.B., Inc. v. Drakulich. 811 P.2d 1305, 1306
(Nev. 1991) (per curium); Johnson v. Cornett 474 N.E.2d 518 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985).
In Wagner, the plaintiffs had retained the defendant attorney to pursue a medical
malpractice claim. 874 A.2d at 1154. After some time, plaintiffs felt that the attorney had
handled their case poorly, and it was apparent that the attorney had "failed to properly
prosecute the case." Id. at 1155. Replacement counsel advised plaintiffs that their
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attorney had "vastly compromised and damaged their causes of action." Id Plaintiffs
were forced to settle their medical malpractice claim for significantly less than it was
worth, and thereafter brought a legal malpractice claim against their attorney, who filed
for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations. Id
When plaintiffs appealed from summary judgment in the attorney's favor, the D.C.
Court of Appeals held that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the
underlying matter had been resolved, reasoning that plaintiffs were not able to ascertain
their injury until the completion of the underlying medical malpractice suit. Id at 115556. The court relied on the leading malpractice treatise, Mallen & Smith, Legal
Malpractice, § 22.11, at 380 (5th ed. 2000), which states that:
An attorney's negligent error in the prosecution of a lawsuit may create
only the potential for injury.... If that potential is not realized until later - if
its occurrence depends on "a contingent or future event" - then the injury is
not sustained until the contingent or future event occurs.
Wagner, 847 A.2d at 1156.
The court reasoned that if plaintiffs were required to sue their attorney prior to the
completion of the underlying case, there would have been "no way to articulate any
injury that could yield ascertainable damages." Id The court issued this ruling despite the
fact that plaintiffs admitted that they were aware at the time they hired replacement
counsel that their attorney had damaged their case. Id. at 1155.
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In Lucey, the court similarly held that the statute of limitations does not run on a
legal malpractice action until the underlying suit, if there is one, is resolved. 703 N.E. 2d
at 476. In that case, the defendant attorney gave plaintiff negligent legal advice in 1989,
which caused the plaintiff to be sued later that year. Id at 475-76. Plaintiff brought a
malpractice action in 1995, after the statute of limitations had run, but before the
underlying suit was resolved. Id The Illinois Appellate Court reversed the trial court's
dismissal of the case based on the statute of limitations, and instead held that the action
was still premature, barring conclusion in the underlying matter. Id at 476. The court
found that without resolution of the underlying matter, the plaintiff would be unable to
prove damages, leaving the plaintiff unable to sustain a malpractice claim because
"damages must be incurred and are not presumed, and the plaintiff must affirmatively
plead and prove that he suffered injuries as a result of the attorney's malpractice." Id
(internal citations omitted). Until actual, non-speculative damages occur, the statute of
limitations cannot run because there is no cause of action, and injury is not discoverable.
The Nevada Supreme Court came to the same conclusion in K.J.B., holding that
plaintiffs to a legal malpractice action filed their claim prematurely because the
underlying matter had not yet concluded. 811 P.2d at 1306. The court noted that, "Where
there has been no final adjudication of the client's case in which the malpractice allegedly
occurred, the element of injury or damage remains speculative and remote, thereby
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making premature the cause of action for professional negligence." Id. The court
dismissed the malpractice action without prejudice, allowing plaintiffs to re-file the
action once the underlying matter had resolved and damages were no longer speculative.
The Indiana Court of Appeals held in Johnson that a cause of action for legal
malpractice did not accrue, and thus the statute of limitations did not begin to run until
the final order of the court in the underlying matter was signed, even when the court had
already announced its forthcoming ruling from the bench. 474 N.E.2d at 518. Defendants
argued that the statute should begin to run when the trial court announced its decision
from the bench, but the court held that even at that point, the decision could be altered in
some way before it was signed. Id, It was only after the decision of the court was made
final through a written and signed order that damages were sufficiently ascertainable to
accrue the cause of action and commence the running of the statute of limitations. Id.
Although Jensen had some understanding that his claim was disadvantaged, (R.
248-245), the resulting injury was undiscoverable until after this Court ruled in Jensen v.
Sawyers because any damages sustained by Jensen were too speculative and remote to be
ascertained. As described in Mallen & Smith's treatise, Young's missing the statute of
limitations in the underlying matter created the potential for injury, which was only
materialized upon this Court's ruling, a clear example of a "contingent event" that
determines whether and when an injury occurs. Just like the plaintiffs in Wagner, Jensen
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could not possibly ascertain his injuries at the time when Young withdrew and was
replaced as counsel, even though Jensen incurred extra expense when his replacement
counsel amended his complaint. (R. 883-882.) When four years had passed from the time
Young missed the statute of limitations, Jensen was the recipient of a nearly $3 million
jury verdict, believing that his replacement counsel had effectively remedied Young's
mistake, and that he was not injured. Jensen's injuries were so remote at the time the
statute of limitations would have run that, as was the case in Lucey, K.J.B., and Johnson,
he was essentially not yet injured. Certainly, it would be unreasonable to expect him to
bring a claim against Young at that time, and irrational to encourage such a claim without
evidence of damages.
The Johnson case, supra, is particularly persuasive because the statute of
limitations was tolled until the final order of the court in the underlying matter was
signed, even where the court had already announced its intended ruling. If damages were
too speculative to cause the statute of limitations to run in that instance because the court
could alter its decision prior to issuing a final order, a pending appeal that has potential to
significantly alter the trial court's decision would also cause damages to be too
speculative or remote. This is especially true considering that Jensen, as a lay individual,
likely could not understand the potential significance of appellate review, nor predict that
this Court would overturn his jury verdict. Jensen did not know, and could not have
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known of his damages until the final judgment of this Court in the underlying matter, due
to the remote and speculative nature of his damages. Therefore, the lack of knowledge
requirement is satisfied, and this Court should move forward with a balancing test.
B. Application of the balancing test evidences that this case presents special
circumstances that make the application of the ordinary statute of limitations
unjust and irrationaL
The discovery rule should apply to toll the statute of limitations because special
circumstances exist where Jensen did not suffer any damage or injury that would have put
a reasonable person on notice of the need for further inquiry into the malpractice claim
until after this Court's opinion in Jensen v. Sawyers was issued. The special
circumstances exception dictates that the discovery rule is applied where application of
the normal statute of limitations is unjust or irrational. Williams, 970 P.2d at 1285;
Walker Drug Co. v. La Sal Oil Co., 902 P.2d 1229, 1231 (Utah 1995). When applying the
special circumstances exception, the court must "balance the hardship imposed on the
plaintiff against any prejudice to the defendant resulting from the difficulties of proof
caused by the passage of time." Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Utah
1992). Here, application of the statute of limitations is unjust, and the balance swings in
favor of Dr. Jensen because: 1) without application of the discovery rule, Jensen would
lose his entire claim, and would be unable to recover to the extent of the injuries caused
by Young, whether he filed prior to the running of the normal statute of limitations or
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not; 2) Young's ability to defend against the legal malpractice action has not been
affected by the passage of time since the evidence of the case is readily available, is not
remote or stale, and Young's arguments would be substantially the same as those he
would have made had Jensen brought this claim earlier; and 3) as discussed above, it was
impossible for Dr. Jensen as a lay man to realize his injury prior to the running of the
normal statute of limitations.
In Williams, this Court declined to apply the discovery rule because, as discussed
above, the plaintiff in that case knew of the injury and the cause of action arising from his
attorney's mistake. 970 P.2d at 1282. However, the Court noted that one circumstance
that requires the application of the discovery rule is when failure to apply it would
produce an unjust or irrational result, based on a balancing test.
The fact that a party's entire claim would be barred without application of the
discovery rule creates a substantial hardship weighing in favor of that party. Klinger v.
Knightly, 791 P.2d 868, 872 (Utah 1990). In Klinger, this Court applied the discovery
rule in a boundary dispute where the trial court had granted summary judgment based on
the running of the statute of limitations to a surveyor added as a third party defendant. Id
at 868. This Court reversed, applying the discovery rule under the special circumstances
exception. Id at 872. In balancing the burdens placed on both parties, the court held that
"the obvious, prejudice to defendants is that without application of the discovery rule,
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their cause of action is completely barred..." Id at 872. There were no other hardships
weighing in the defendant's favor, yet the court still applied the discovery rule. Id
A factor in this Court's decision in Klinger was the fact that the evidence required
for the surveyor to defend against the third party claim was not remote or stale. Id.
Indeed, the primary evidence against the surveyor was a written and signed survey
certificate, which was still available. Id The Court considered the nature of how the
surveyor would defend against the claim to be influential in swaying the balance of
special circumstances toward applying the discovery rule.
The special and unusual circumstances of this case weigh in favor of applying the
discovery rule and tolling the statute of limitations until this Court's ruling in Jensen v.
Sawyers. The hardships Jensen would face if the rule were not applied are much greater
than the burden placed on Young due to the passage of time. First, as in Klinger, if the
discovery rule were not to apply, Jensen would have no recourse for his injuries caused
by Young's malpractice. If he had filed within the ordinary statute of limitations, he
would have been unable to state a claim because he would not be able to assert any nonspeculative injury or damages. At the very most, he would only have been able to recover
attorneys' fees for amending his complaint, amounting to only $14,000, (R. 897), when a
jury had found he was injured to a much greater extent. See Jensen, 2005 UT 81,122. If
the discovery rule did not apply in this situation, Jensen would be left with an extensively
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damaged reputation and career, and no recourse to recover his losses, whether his claim
was filed within the ordinary statute of limitations or not.
Furthermore, Young would not be greatly burdened by defending against a
malpractice action at this time, rather than at the time when the normal statute of
limitations would have run. The evidence here, as in Klinger, is not stale or remote. All of
the facts surrounding the legal malpractice are generally recorded in depositions already
taken, as well as the record of Jensen v. Sawyers. Any arguments Young could make in
defending this action, such as, inter alia, lack of attorney-client relationship or lack of
injury are as viable at this time as they would have been had Jensen filed suit earlier.
Therefore, Young will not be substantially burdened by the application of the discovery
rule, in juxtaposition to Jensen, who will face severe and undue hardship if the rule was
not applied.
Failure to apply the discovery rule in this situation would be particularly unjust
and irrational because at the time Young allowed the statue of limitations to pass, Jensen
understood only that his case had been "disadvantaged." (R. 248-245.) Yet he also
believed that Young's mistake could be remedied. (R. 248-245.) A successful remedy
appeared to have been effected when Jensen was allowed to amend his complaint and
litigate his claim to a final judgment in his favor. He did not realize that he was actually
injured until his award was reversed by this Court in 2005.
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Appellee may argue that Jensen was on notice of his injury when the trial court
dismissed his defamation claim in 1999. (R. 946.) However, it is unlikely that Dr. Jensen,
who is not legally trained, would understand that he had been injured when, at the same
time his defamation claim was dismissed, he was allowed to amend his complaint.
Finding that Jensen knew or should have known that he was damaged prior to this
Court's decision assumes he would realize that his judgment in the trial court would be
reversed on appeal and should bring suit against his attorney after he was essentially
made whole by a multimillion dollar jury verdict.
The facts of this case demonstrate the very type of special circumstances with
attendant irrational and unjust results, which the discovery rule is intended to prevent. To
find otherwise places an unreasonable burden of legal clairvoyance upon Dr. Jensen.
Because applying the normal statute of limitations in this case would have such an effect,
this Court should apply the discovery rule and run the statute of limitations from the time
that Jensen v. Sawyers was decided.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant requests this Court to reverse the trial court's
grant of summary judgment and find that the discovery rule applies to toll the statute of
limitations on Jensen's malpractice claim until the date of this Court's 2005 decision in
Jensen v. Sawyers.
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DATED this
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day of August.
STRONG & HANNI

Peter H. Chnstensen
Sade A. Turner
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant Jensen
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ADDENDUM
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure states as follows:
Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim
or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from
the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by
the adverse party, move for summary judgment upon all or any part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is
asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move for summary
judgment as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be in
accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment,
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there
is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is not
rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court
at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and
by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without
substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith
controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without
substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are
just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and
the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to
testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof
referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may
permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to
interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to file
1

such a response.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party
opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts
essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for
judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to
be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are
presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order
the party presenting them to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses
which the filing of the affidavits caused, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any
offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
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THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER GRANTING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Richard D. Burbidge (#0492)
Jefferson W. Gross (#8339)
Andrew J. Dymek (#9277)
BURBIDGE MITCHELL & GROSS
215 South State, Suite 920
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-6677
Facsimile: (801) 355-2341
Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MICHAEL H. JENSEN,
Plaintiff,

ORDER FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND DISMISSAL WITH
PREJUDICE

vs.
ALLEN K. YOUNG,
Defendant.

Civil No. 070400519
Judge Samuel D. McVey

Defendant Allen K. Young's ("Young") Motion for Summary Judgment came on
regularly before the above-entitled Court on June 30, 2008 at 10:00 a.m. before the
Honorable Samuel D. McVey, Judge. Richard D. Burbidge of Burbidge, Mitchell &
Gross appeared on behalf of Defendant Young. Phillip Fishier of Strong & Hanni
appeared on behalf of Plaintiff Michael H. Jensen ("Jensen").
The Court notes that a supplemental brief in support of the Motion for Summary
Judgment was filed on behalf of Young, to which a motion to strike was filed. At oral
argument, counsel for Jensen withdrew the objection to the supplemental brief. The

Court has considered all of the pleadings supporting and opposing the Motion for
Summary Judgment, and having heard the arguments of counsel, and being fully advised
in this matter, HEREBY ORDERS, JUDGES AND DECREES AS FOLLOWS:
1.

The Court has reviewed and is aware of the asserted factual issues

concerning the initial formation of the attorney/client relationship between Jensen and
Young. The Court finds that at least during the period of February through April 1997,
Young had been retained by Jensen and a retainer agreement was executed. Further, the
Court deems potential questions of fact regarding an earlier attorney/client relationship
between Jensen and Young not to raise material issues of fact as to the determinative
issue concerning the application of the statute of limitations in this matter.
2.

The record reflects that in approximately June of 1997 Young told Jensen

that he had "blown" the statute of limitations. Jensen asserts that Young said he could
"fix it" or mitigate the effects by virtue of the fraud claim that had been asserted. There
may be some basis to assert that there was passive concealment on the part of Young,
although unintended, but the effects of any such concealment, intended or not, passive or
active, disappeared when Jensen retained the services of his new counsel, Dale Gardiner,
and others in January 1999. When the defamation claims on the first and second
broadcasts were dismissed on April 22, 1999 (together with the fraud claim with which
Jensen claims Young thought the damages for missing the statute on the first and second
broadcasts could be mitigated or cured), it is undisputed that Jensen knew he had been
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"disadvantaged." Shortly thereafter Mr. Gardiner spoke with Jensen on more than one
occasion about suing Young. Mr. Gardiner advised Jensen that he would not sue Young
because he had made the decision not to sue lawyers. At that time Jensen was aware that
both the defamation and fraud claims were gone and although Gardiner asserted other
claims, it is clear from the record that he at no time provided any assurance that they
would resurrect the defamation claims that had been dismissed.
3.

Accordingly, an analysis of claims of concealment or of special

circumstances is not necessary in light of the undisputed fact that the Jensen knew or
should have known of the claims against Young not later than approximately April 22,
1999, well within the applicable four year statute of limitation period. In that regard,
while Jensen argues that he did not know the full extent of his damages, it is not
necessary for a party to know everything about the claim or all of the elements of damage.
All that is necessary is that there is sufficient knowledge of the claim that a reasonable
person would investigate further.
ACCORDINGLY, Defendant Young's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby
granted and the complaint and all claims thereunder are hereby dismissed with prejudice
and on the merits.
//
//
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DATED this

day of July, 2008.
BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE SAMUEL D. McVEY
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
Approved as to form:
STRONG &HANNI

Phillip R. Fishier
Attorneys for Plaintiff Jensen

4

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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WITH PREJUDICE was served as follows:
VIA FACSIMILE ONLY

Philip R. Fishier
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